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Abstract
The Studi di Settore are used by the Italian tax administration to calculate reference revenue
levels for small businesses. Recently new rules have been introduced in order to render the Studi
di Settore more efficient in producing realistic estimates, with the aim of reducing the “legalized
evasion” that might arise in case of a systematic downward bias. Voices of the involved categories,
however, convinced the Government to partially step back. Building upon the standard firm’s
tax evasion model of Cowell (2003) and the approach of Santoro (2006) we show that, under
given conditions, an efficiency increase might backfire implying a larger overall tax evasion and a
smaller tax revenue.
JEL codes: H25, H26, K42.
1 Introduction
The Studi di Settore are a quite peculiar reference system used by the Italian Tax Administration in its
relationships with small and medium size firms and with independent workers since about ten years.
Through a software provided by the tax administration, each taxpayer calculates her estimated gross
revenue according to the Studio di Settore pertaining to her field of activity.1 The estimate is based on
the data imputed by the taxpayer describing the physical and economic characteristics of her activity,
such as the number of employees, the dimensions of the premises, etc. Moreover, the software also
calculates indexes that signal possible incoherence or irregularity in the data imputed by the taxpayer.
The estimated revenue represents a benchmark: those who report less revenue in filling their income
tax form2 have a larger probability of being audited. While also those who comply with their Studio
di Settore still have a positive probability of being selected for some type of audit according to the
law, the general perception is that their situation is free of risk; hence, for simplicity, in this paper it
will thus be assumed that those who report the benchmark revenue are in a sure position.
The Studi di Settore are realized by using standard statistical techniques that single out clusters of
taxpayers having similar characteristics, relying on data from past revenue reports and from specific
surveys. The Studi di Settore are validated by commissions in which members of the representative
∗Corresponding author: Dept. of Public Policy and Public Choice Polis, University of Eastern Piedmont, Via Cavour
84, 15100 Alessandria (Italy). Phone: +39-131-283718; fax: +39-131-283704; e-mail: carla.marchese@sp.unipmn.it
†Dept. of Public Policy and Public Choice Polis, University of Eastern Piedmont, Via Cavour 84, 15100 Alessandria
(Italy); e-mail: fabio.privileggi@sp.unipmn.it.
1There were 206 Studi di Settore fully working in June 2007, while further ones are in preparation.
2The tax report must include also the raw data relevant for the estimation of the benchmark.
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organizations of the taxpayers involved participate. Due to their complex process of elaboration and
application, the Studi di Settore can exert many roles:
• Providing some reference revenue, agreed upon by the government and the representative orga-
nizations of the taxpayers involved, in a context of social negotiations and agreements. The aim
is that of relying on the support of the groups involved, i.e., presumably, on the interests of their
representative member. As long as the latter is at least a partial complier, she is likely to prefer
that her competitors do not benefit from a too huge tax evasion. This approach should thus
be apt at avoiding forms of tax evasion epidemics, a phenomenon that in Italy might outburst
because of the very large number of small businesses, which can be audited with a reason-
able probability only at a large cost. Moreover, if the Italian economy would hopefully evolve
toward stronger competition and increasing firm’s dimensions, the system might also progres-
sively support a larger compliance.
• Providing a benchmark to the tax administration for programming tax audits, in order to in-
crease their effectiveness. This could result both from the selection of potentially more produc-
tive targets (those who do not conform to the Studi di Settore), and from the possibility of using
the estimates in order to reinforce the evidence of evasion in cases that go to the courts, thus
increasing the probability of sanctioning evasion.
• Offering to the taxpayers a kind of settlement, based on a detailed estimation of the taxpayer
revenue and hence willingness to pay in order to avoid audits. In this context, the Studi di
Settore introduce a kind of cut-off rule (see, e.g., Reinganum and Wilde [3]). The tax adminis-
tration renounces to audit those who report at least the benchmark revenue in order to save audit
costs and to extract from taxpayers who comply some extra revenue that absorbs what would
otherwise have been wasted in concealing the taxable income.
How well the Studi di Settore have actually served the aforementioned goals is a very debated
question that will not be addressed here.3 The interest of the Italian public opinion in the Studi
di Settore peaked in Summer 2007, when taxpayers had to prepare their tax reports on the basis
of some new rules introduced by the 2007 Financial law. The groups involved voiced because the
benchmark revenues were increased in many instances and the new rules had not been negotiated
with the representative organizations of the taxpayers. The protest led to a partial freezing of the new
rules.
This paper aims at clarifying, from a theoretical point of view, what are the economic conse-
quences of manoeuvring the benchmark of the Studi di Settore. The available literature4 points out
that in general any cut-off rule involves relevant problems, mainly in terms of equity. Horizontal
equity is violated as long as taxpayers with the same income but different income indicators receive
proposals for “settlements” of different amount. Moreover, inside each group there is a vertical eq-
uity problem, since those who have an income larger than the benchmark, but report according to the
benchmark, are not audited. Hence above the benchmark taxes are not increasing with income.5
These and other critical aspects have been analyzed with reference to the Italian experience by
Santoro [5], who points out that the Studi di Settore have through time become ‘inefficient’: they
systematically understate the true firm’s revenue and introduce a form of legalized tax evasion, which
3For a discussion see Russo [4]. Among the many problems involved, let us recall the fact that, as only gross revenue
is considered by the Studi di Settore while taxes depend on the net one, there has been scope for cheating in reporting
costs, and thus for unwanted effects on the tax revenue.
4For a Survey, see Marchese [2].
5For a case in which the actual tax system becomes more progressive than the legal one under a cut-off rule see
Scotchmer [6].
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has also widened progressively thanks to the tricks put forth by taxpayers in order to exploit the
loopholes of the system. Increasing the efficiency of the Studi di Settore thus appears to be a way for
reducing the legalized evasion and for reinforcing the threat of controls, with beneficial results both
in terms of equity and of tax revenue. In the following, however, we show that, on the ground of tax
revenue and of the efficiency of the tax system as a whole, this is not necessarily the case.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the taxpayer problem in a system where
the Studi di Settore are applied by building on standard firm’s tax evasion models and on Santoro
[5]. After describing the taxpayer optimal choice in Section 3, some comparative statics follows in
Section 4. Section 5 presents our main result on the effects on Government Revenue of manoeuvring
the efficiency rate of the Studi di Settore. Finally, Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
2 The basic problem
Following Cowell [1] and Santoro [5] let us consider a representative firm that aims at maximizing
the expected profit:
pi = {q [1− T (ϕ)]−m}x, (1)
where q is the product price, x is the quantity produced, m is the constant marginal production cost,
ϕ is the share of revenue concealed, with 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1, and T (ϕ) is the total outlay per unit of revenue,
which the firm must disburse in order to cope with the tax system. As in Cowell [1], we do not
specify the market type, so that either q is a parameter (as the market is competitive) or it is given by
the inverse demand q(x) if the firm enjoys some market power.
By considering (1) as the objective of the taxpayer, we assume that the optimal choice for con-
cealment ϕ does not depend on the price q, on the cost m and on the quantity produced either. This
allows us to tackle directly the ‘minimum outlay’ problem faced by the taxpayer.
The Studio di Settore provides a ‘benchmark’ estimated revenue for each taxpayer, given by:
eqx ≤ qx.
Parameter e ≤ 1 describes the efficiency rate6 of the tax administration in estimating the taxpayer
revenue through the Studi di Settore. The efficiency rate depends on the ability of the tax adminis-
tration in exploiting information about taxpayers coming from all the past income reports, and to use
statistical techniques and checks about the inconsistencies in order to neutralize possible manipula-
tions. It is thus assumed, for the sake of simplicity, that the taxpayer has no control over the e value.
The tax administration can, in principle, set an e value smaller than the one that it could technically
achieve, whenever the latter choice is optimal in view of maximizing the Government revenue. Since
the software used by the Italian tax administration for the Studi di Settore produces results on an indi-
vidual basis, it makes sense to consider a percentage value of the efficiency parameter e, instead than
an absolute one as did Santoro [5].
Under a proportional tax system, if the taxpayer decides to comply with the Studi di Settore, the
unit outlay is (1− ϕ) τ , with 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1 − e, where 0 < τ < 1 is the official tax rate. Let us now
consider the possibility of reporting revenue according to the general rules. In this case the firm must
consider that reports might be audited.
Following Santoro [5], the audit probability is assumed to be linear in ϕ; specifically:
p (ϕ) = a [ϕ− (1− e)] , (2)
6In principle, also values e > 1 might arise; in this paper we rule them out since the debate about the Italian Studi di
Settore focussed mainly on cases in which e < 1.
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where parameter a is such that 0 < a ≤ 1/e. The idea is that the tax administration, relying on the
methodology of the Studi di Settore and on the income report, receives signals about the tax evasion
share ϕ. These signals, however, are more blurred the larger is the inefficiency rate (1− e).
To let (2) be meaningful, in the following we shall use it for values 1 − e < ϕ ≤ 1. Hence, the
expected tax rate per unit of revenue is given by:
Et (ϕ) = [1− ϕ+ (1 + s) p (ϕ)ϕ] τ = {1− ϕ+ a (1 + s) [ϕ− (1− e)]ϕ} τ, (3)
where s > 1 is the penalty rate. Evading some fraction ϕ of revenue has a concealment cost,7 which
we shall denote by g (ϕ), with g (0) = 0, g′ (ϕ) > 0 and g′′ (ϕ) ≥ 0.
Taking into consideration this possibility as well, we are able to define a quite general objective
for the taxpayer – the total outlay T (ϕ) – by letting
T (ϕ) =
{
(1− ϕ) τ if 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1− e
Et (ϕ) + g (ϕ) if 1− e < ϕ ≤ 1. (4)
The firm thus minimize T (ϕ) subject to the constraint 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1; formally:
minT (ϕ)
sub ϕ ∈ [0, 1] . (5)
By construction, T (ϕ) is discontinuous in ϕ = 1− e, thus, even if the constraint is compact, we
must be careful in guaranteeing existence of a solution.
Lemma 1 The function T (ϕ) defined in (4) is lower semicontinuous. Therefore, being the constraint
[0, 1] compact, Weierstrass Theorem applies and a solution of (5) always exists.
Proof. By construction, the only discontinuity point is ϕ = 1−e; therefore, it is sufficient to show that
lim infϕ→(1−e) T (ϕ) ≥ T (1− e). As Et (ϕ) + g (ϕ) is a continuous function on its natural domain,
the following holds: lim infϕ→(1−e)+ [Et (ϕ) + g (ϕ)] = limϕ→(1−e)+ [Et (ϕ) + g (ϕ)] = Et (1− e) +
g (1− e) = τe + g (1− e) ≥ τe = T (1− e), where the inequality holds because g (1− e) ≥ 0.
Since T (ϕ) is left-continuous on ϕ = 1− e, i.e. limϕ→(1−e)− T (ϕ) = T (1− e) = τe, T (ϕ) is lower
semicontinuous.
Roughly speaking, even if T (ϕ) is discontinuous, i.e., its graph is made up of two separate curves
(the first describing outlays under compliance with the Studi di Settore, the second under larger eva-
sion), nevertheless a solution exists because the first curve is strictly decreasing [T ′ (ϕ) = −τ < 0
for 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1− e] and its right extrema, T (1− e), cannot be taller than the beginning of the second
curve.
Remark 1 Since g (0) = 0 and g is strictly increasing, limϕ→(1−e)+ T (ϕ) = limϕ→(1−e)+ [Et (ϕ)+
g (ϕ)] > τe = limϕ→(1−e)− T (ϕ) always holds with strict inequality whenever e < 1. In other words,
as ϕ crosses the discontinuity point 1− e the graph of T (ϕ) jumps upward from the first curve to the
second one; such ‘jump’ is strictly positive because the costs of concealment are: g (1− e) > 0 for
all e < 1.
7The concealment cost might be due to the necessity of double accounting, to the loss of control on agents that
cooperate in hiding income, etc. If the firm does not bear these costs, its evasion is fully evident and punished with
certainty. Note also that the firm not complying with the Studio di Settore must hide ϕ and not ϕ− (1− e), since in case
of audit the whole evasion is found out.
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3 The optimal outlay
First we need assumptions assuring interiority of any solution ϕ∗ of (5). Whenever e < 1, we have
seen that T (ϕ) is strictly decreasing for 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1−e; therefore, an optimal solution ϕ∗ must satisfy
ϕ∗ ≥ 1− e > 0. That is, since the “legalized evasion” under the Studi di Settore is 1− e, it would be
meaningless to evade less than this amount. On the other hand, in order to exclude the possibility of
full evasion, let us assume that T ′ (1) = (Et)′ (1) + g′ (1) > 0 holds whenever e < 1; since
(Et)′ (ϕ) + g′ (ϕ) = −{1− a (1 + s) [2ϕ− (1− e)]} τ + g′ (ϕ) , (6)
(Et)′ (1) + g′ (1) = − [1− a (1 + s) (1 + e)] τ + g′ (1), and thus the condition we are looking for is
g′ (1) > [1− a (1 + s) (1 + e)] τ . As we want to consider several values of efficiency parameter e,
we shall assume the following slightly stronger condition which is independent of e.
A. 1 g′ (1) > [1− a (1 + s)] τ .
Under A.1 any solution ϕ∗ of (5) is such that 0 < ϕ∗ < 1.
Being T ′′ (ϕ) = (Et)′′ (ϕ) + g′′ (ϕ) = 2a (1 + s) τ + g′′ (ϕ) > 0 for ϕ > 1 − e, T (ϕ) is strictly
convex over (1− e, 1], and hence there can be at most one (interior) relative minimum 1−e < ϕ∗r < 1,
which must satisfy the F.O.C.:8
g′ (ϕ∗r) = {1− a (1 + s) [2ϕ
∗
r − (1− e)]} τ, (7)
where the LHS represents the marginal cost and the RHS the expected marginal benefit or the expected
rate of return of tax evasion. On the other hand, T (ϕ) is strictly decreasing over [0, 1− e] and hence,
since limϕ→(1−e)+ [Et (ϕ) + g (ϕ)] > τe = T (1− e) whenever e < 1 (see Remark 1), ϕ∗ℓ = 1 − e
is always a relative minimum, where T (1− e) = τe. We conclude that, when e < 1, there can be
at most two relative minima: ϕ∗ℓ = 1 − e and ϕ∗r > ϕ∗ℓ respectively, where ϕ∗r is a stationary point
satisfying (7). Clearly, one of them is the solution of (5).
In words, either the best choice of the firm is to comply with the Studio di Settore by evading
ϕ∗ℓ = 1 − e, or the best choice is opting for a larger evasion ϕ∗r. There may be, however, also some
circumstances in which the two choices are indifferent; this happens when a value ê of the efficiency
parameter e exists such that Et (ϕ∗r) + g (ϕ∗r) = τ ê. In such cases the two distinct relative minima,
ϕ∗ℓ = 1 − ê and ϕ∗r, both become absolute minima and solve (5). Hence, our framework cannot
rule out multiple solutions for problem (5). Actually, as we shall see in the following section, such
multiplicity of solutions will provide the basis for our main result.
Figure 1 portraits the three possible scenarios for problem (5). In figure 1(a) the solution is ϕ∗ℓ =
1 − e, as the second curve of the graph of T (ϕ), Et (ϕ) + g (ϕ), lies above T (1− e) = τe for all
1− e < ϕ ≤ 1; this is the case in which the taxpayer complies with the Studio di Settore. Viceversa,
in figure 1(b) the solution is the stationary point 1 − e < ϕ∗r < 1, as Et (ϕ∗r) + g (ϕ∗r) < τe; here
the taxpayer chooses to evade a larger amount ϕ∗r > 1 − e. Finally, figure 1(c) plots the ‘multiple
solution’ case where the absolute minimum in (5) is reached on both ϕ∗ℓ = 1 − ê and ϕ∗r, and its
value is τ ê = Et (ϕ∗r)+g (ϕ∗r); this last scenario represents indifference between compliance with the
Studio di Settore and a larger evasion.
8We denote such relative minimum – provided it exists – by ϕ∗r , where the subscript ‘r’ stands for right relative
minimum, as opposed to the left relative minimum, ϕ∗ℓ = 1− e, which will be discussed shortly after.
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FIGURE 1: three possible scenarios for problem (5).
Problem (5) is thus equivalent to
V (e) = min {τe,Et [ϕ∗r (e)] + g [ϕ
∗
r (e)]} , (8)
where ϕ∗r (e) is the unique solution of (7) when the efficiency parameter is 0 < e < 1.9 This formula-
tion emphasizes the choice of the taxpayer between compliance with the Studi di Settore, τe, and tax
evasion, Et [ϕ∗r (e)] + g [ϕ∗r (e)]. In (8) V (e) denotes the value as a function of efficiency parameter
e; its study will be the subject of next section.
Remark 2 In this model tax evasion cannot be eradicated by means of parameters controlled by the
tax administration. To see this, note that, as e → 1, by construction (4) Et (ϕ) + g (ϕ) becomes
relevant for all 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1. In this case either (7) is satisfied for some ϕ∗r (1) > 0, thus allowing for a
positive evasion even under the most efficiency, or (7) does not hold for all 0 < ϕ < 1 [being Et (ϕ)+
g (ϕ) everywhere strictly increasing thanks to assumption A.1] and lower values of e would not induce
a positive tax evasion. In the latter case tax evasion would be hampered by its own concealment cost
and not by government action. This feature of the model, however, does not represent a problem since
we aim at focussing on tax evasion. By assuming (Et)′ (0) + g′ (0) < 0, or, equivalently, g′ (0) < τ ,
we thus refer to cases in which the government manoeuvre of the tax system parameters a, e, s and τ
cannot let ϕ→ 0, i.e., cannot eradicate tax evasion.
9Note that in generalϕ∗r (e) may not exist; such case occurs ifEt (ϕ)+g (ϕ) is strictly increasing for 1−e < ϕ ≤ 1. By
Lemma 1, however, Problem (8) has a solution also in this peculiar case; since Et (ϕ)+ g (ϕ) > τe for all 1− e < ϕ ≤ 1,
ϕ∗ℓ = 1− e is the unique solution. Figure 1(a) shows an example of this type.
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4 Comparative statics: the threshold ê
In this section we aim at investigating how solutions of (8) are affected by different values of the
efficiency parameter e; that is, our goal is to understand how the choices of the tax administration
with reference to the efficiency of the Studi di Settore affect preferences either for compliance with
the benchmark or for evasion ϕ > 1− e.
Lemma 2 Assume that A.1 holds and some value 0 < e < 1 exists such that ϕ∗r (e) satisfies (7) and
Et [ϕ∗r (e)]+g [ϕ
∗
r (e)] ≤ τe. Then there is a unique 0 < ê < 1 such that Et [ϕ∗r (ê)]+g [ϕ∗r (ê)] = τ ê;
moreover, Et (ϕ)+g (ϕ) > τe for all ϕ > 1−e and for all 0 ≤ e < ê, while Et [ϕ∗r (e)]+g [ϕ∗r (e)] <
τe for all ê < e ≤ 1.
Proof. First note that, by definition (4), lime→0 [Et (ϕ) + g (ϕ)] = g (1) > 0 = lime→0 τe, therefore
a right-hand neighborhood of 0, N0+ , exists such that Et (ϕ) + g (ϕ) > τe for all ϕ > 1 − e and
for all e ∈ N0+ . In other words, for e sufficiently small the solution of (8) is V (e) = τe. But, by
assumption, there is a value 0 < e < 1 such that Et [ϕ∗r (e)] + g [ϕ∗r (e)] ≤ τe; hence a value ê such
that Et [ϕ∗r (ê)] + g [ϕ∗r (ê)] = τ ê exists.
To establish uniqueness of ê we show that (∂/∂e) {Et [ϕ∗r (e)] + g [ϕ∗r (e)]} < τ = (∂/∂e) τe.
Direct differentiation yields
∂
∂e
{Et [ϕ∗r (e)] + g [ϕ
∗
r (e)]} =
{
− (ϕ∗r)
′ (e) + a (1 + s)
[
2ϕ∗r (e) (ϕ
∗
r)
′ (e)
+ϕ∗r (e)− (1− e) (ϕ
∗
r)
′ (e)
]}
τ + g′ [ϕ∗r (e)] (ϕ
∗
r)
′ (e)
= {−1 + a (1 + s) [2ϕ∗r (e)− (1− e)]} τ (ϕ
∗
r)
′ (e)
+ a (1 + s)ϕ∗r (e) τ + g
′ [ϕ∗r (e)] (ϕ
∗
r)
′ (e)
= −g′ [ϕ∗r (e)] (ϕ
∗
r)
′ (e) + a (1 + s)ϕ∗r (e) τ + g
′ [ϕ∗r (e)] (ϕ
∗
r)
′ (e)
= a (1 + s)ϕ∗r (e) τ,
where in the third equality we have substituted the first addend as in (7). By rearranging terms in (7),
it is easily seen that
a (1 + s)ϕ∗r (e) τ = −g
′ [ϕ∗r (e)] + τ − a (1 + s) [ϕ
∗
r (e)− (1− e)] τ
< τ − a (1 + s) [ϕ∗r (e)− (1− e)] τ
< τ,
where the first inequality holds because −g′ [ϕ∗r (e)] < 0 and the second inequality follows from the
fact that ϕ∗r (e) is a (minimum) stationary point for Et (ϕ)+ g (ϕ), and hence, by the discussion in the
previous section, ϕ∗r (e) > (1− e). Thus, (∂/∂e) {Et [ϕ∗r (e)] + g [ϕ∗r (e)]} < τ .
The main result of this section says that the firm will be indifferent between complying with
the Studio di Settore or evading an amount ϕ∗r (e) larger than 1 − e only in one case: when the tax
administration sets the efficiency value at the threshold ê. In this case the firm exactly balances
the advantage of avoiding concealment costs with the disadvantage of paying a larger tax under the
Studio di Settore, so that its total outlay stays the same. Hence, the unique threshold value ê for
the administration efficiency characterizes the situation of indifference between compliance with the
Studi di Settore and tax evasion from the taxpayer point of view. It corresponds to the (unique) case
in which the objective function T (ϕ) in (5) reaches its absolute minimum in two distinct points:
ϕ∗ℓ = 1− ê and ϕ∗r (ê), with ϕ∗ℓ < ϕ∗r (ê).
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5 Government revenue
By assuming that the taxpayer chooses the Studi di Settore when the efficiency level is ê (i.e., when
she is indifferent between compliance and evasion), then for all 0 < e ≤ ê the solution of (8)
is ϕ∗ℓ = 1 − e and the unit government revenue is V (e) = τe. Conversely, if e > ê V (e) =
Et [ϕ∗r (e)] + g [ϕ
∗
r (e)] < τe and the taxpayer chooses to evade; in this scenario the unit government
revenue is Et [ϕ∗r (e)] < Et [ϕ∗r (e)]+g [ϕ∗r (e)] < τe. In other words, a slight increase of the efficiency
parameter above the threshold ê, by letting the taxpayer switch from compliance to the Studi di Settore
to tax evasion causes a drastic fall in terms of government revenues. Specifically, our main result states
that there is a nontrivial open interval such that Et [ϕ∗r (e)] < τe for all e belonging to such interval.
Let es be the smallest e, if exists, such that Et [ϕ∗r (es)] = τ ê, and let e˜ = min {es, 1}.
Proposition 1 Under the assumptions of Lemma 2 the government revenue is smaller than τ ê =
V (ê) for all ê < e < e˜. The revenue loss tends to g [ϕ∗r (ê)] > 0 as e→ ê+.
Proof. At the threshold ê, τ ê = Et [ϕ∗r (ê)]+g [ϕ∗r (ê)] > Et [ϕ∗r (ê)]. Since Et [ϕ∗r (e)] is a continuous
function of e, Et [ϕ∗r (e)] < τê for all ê < e < e˜, and the first part of the proposition is established.
As lime→ê+ Et [ϕ∗r (e)] = Et [ϕ∗r (ê)], the gap between τ ê = Et [ϕ∗r (ê)] + g [ϕ∗r (ê)] and Et [ϕ∗r (ê)] at
the (right-hand side) discontinuity point ê is g [ϕ∗r (ê)].
Our model (5) built upon a discontinuity point,ϕ = 1−e, in terms of concealed revenues translates
into a discontinuity point, the threshold ê, in terms of efficiency. Such discontinuity emphasizes a
possible negative side-effect of enhancing efficiency of the Studi di Settore around the threshold ê,
where the shift from compliance with the Studi di Settore to tax evasion implies that the taxpayer
invests resources into concealment costs, subtracting them to the Government revenue. However,
since the efficiency parameter also positively affects the expected tax paid by those who do not comply
with the Studi di Settore, if e increases further the Government revenue may recover and even surpass
the level reached at the threshold ê; this occurs for e ≥ e˜, provided that e˜ < 1.
Example 1 Figure 2 plots τe, Et [ϕ∗r (e)]+g [ϕ∗r (e)] and Et [ϕ∗r (e)] as functions of e for the following
parameters values: g(ϕ) = 0.1ϕ2, s = 3, τ = 0.2 and a = 0.3. For low efficiency levels e the firm
prefers to comply with the Studi di Settore since this involves a smaller total outlay per unit of revenue:
V (e) = τe < Et [ϕ∗r (e)] + g [ϕ
∗
r (e)]. For e > ê ≃ 0.75 the opposite holds and the firm shifts to
the stationary solution ϕ∗r (e). At the threshold ê ≃ 0.75 the shift from compliance with the Studi
di Settore to evasion implies a drop in tax revenue, since the government is no more able to cash
in an amount equivalent to the concealment cost, g [ϕ∗r (ê)]. If the efficiency e increases further, the
expected revenue rate from the stationary solution, Et [ϕ∗r (e)], increases. In this example Et [ϕ∗r (e)]
recovers the level τ ê at e˜ = es ≃ 0.88 < 1. There might also be cases in which it never reaches the
upper threshold: in such circumstances e˜ = 1.
In this paper the costs that the tax administration bear in order to organize its activity have been
disregarded, but it is clear that a shift from compliance with the Studi di Settore to evasion increases
the number of audits that must be conducted and thus the costs for the tax administration. Moreover,
the tax revenue becomes to a larger extent dependent on expected sanctions rather than on voluntary
payments, with a negative impact as long as the tax administration is risk averse. Also the increase
of the efficiency e is likely to involve administrative costs for both the tax administration and the
taxpayers.
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FIGURE 2: the government incurs a revenue loss for efficiency levels e between ê ≃ 0.75 and e˜ ≃ 0.88.
6 Conclusions
The policy suggestions that stem from this model are the following. If the parameters of the tax
system (i.e., the tax rate τ , the level of sanctions s and the parameters of the probability function other
than e) are given, while the tax administration aims at maximizing the tax revenue, the efficiency of
the Studi di Settore should be increased as long as this does not imply surpassing the threshold ê. An
increase in e that moves it beyond the threshold ê would be beneficial only if it implies a (perhaps
quite large) jump beyond the upper value e˜, provided that e˜ < 1. If e˜ = 1 no jump of this type can
be done. Moreover, if the threshold ê is surpassed, the Studi di Settore just work as a reference point
for auditing taxpayers, in order to increase the probability of extracting resources from non compliers
through costly audits, and not as a system that helps in enlarging both voluntary compliance and tax
revenue.
As long as the parameters of the tax system other than e can be increased at will – specifically,
a and s, controlling detection probability and sanction respectively – tax evasion will tend to vanish.
As a matter of fact, Et [ϕ∗r (e)] + g [ϕ∗r (e)] is increasing in a and s, and thus it would become larger
and larger while τe remains constant. In view of problem (8) this implies that the threshold ê would
be pushed toward its right extrema, ê → 1, thus enlarging at will the scope for beneficial efficiency
increases.
The model can also be used as a support for analyzing the causes and the consequences of the
row that arose in Italy around the Studi di Settore in the Summer 2007. That is, one may read the
increase in the benchmark revenues introduced by the new 2007 rules as an increase of the efficiency
parameter e. While any e increase is likely to be opposed by self interested taxpayers, it seems
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as though movements near the threshold ê are more visible, and thus likely to give rise to stronger
reactions by those who are on the verge of shifting from compliance with the Studi di Settore to non
compliance. The very fact that a wide spontaneous protest of the categories involved arose against
the efficiency increase, running initially also against the representative organizations, accused of not
performing their duties, suggests that a significant group of taxpayers felt of being on such a threshold.
Looking at the problem from the other side, i.e. that of the tax administration, it was probably not
perceived that increasing a relative price (that of conforming to the Studi di Settore) was not a sure
recipe for increasing the tax revenue.
The political justifications of the new rules emphasized that the Studi di Settore are mainly a
basis for programming profitable audits, like, e.g., the DIF point system used by the American tax
administration.10 But a much deeper reform (and probably a costly one) should have been enacted in
order to tune the Studi di Settore in such a way as to exclude the other many roles that they play. That
is, if the Studi di Settore must just work as a support for tax auditors, why taxpayers should still be
fully informed about the details of the system, asked of cooperating deeply in its implementation and
lured into conforming to the benchmark with perspective benefits that clearly belong to the logic of
settlements?
Summing up, while larger data availability and specific empirical analyses would be needed in
order to fully understand the present working and the perspectives of the Studi di Settore, the model
presented in this paper might help in focussing on the relevant questions, in order to prevent dangerous
policy swings, as the one occurred in Italy in Summer 2007.
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